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SUMMARY
Systems consisting of large (or even unbounded) number of behaviorally sim-
ilar processes communicating with each other are known as parameterized systems.
Such systems are common in distributed computing and real-life software systems.
Verifying properties for such systems involves reasoning about unboundedly many
processes and hence cannot be accomplished directly by model-checking.
In this thesis, we present an abstraction refinement based verification framework
for parameterized systems. We enhance the well-known Spin model checker with
process count abstraction to develop a time/memory efficient Linear-time Tempo-
ral Logic (LTL) verifier for parameterized systems. We also developed methods to
automatically detect spurious counter-examples and refine the abstraction. The us-
ability / scalability of our checker is demonstrated via the modeling and automated
verification of several real-life parameterized control systems and protocols.
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1.1 Background and Motivation
Systems that utilize cache-coherence or telecommunication protocols are common in
distributed computing. Such systems usually consist of a large number of processes of
the same type communicating with each other, or with processes of the other types.
The number of processes is usually unknown prior to system deployment, which poses
difficulty in verification and validation of system correctness.
Among the existing approaches, model checking has been advertised as a promis-
ing automated technique for ensuring correctness of complex distributed software
systems. However, modeling of systems with (potentially) unbounded number of pro-
cesses results in infinite-state system, which is not suitable for explicit model-checking.
Moreover, fixing the number of processes to a constant (i.e., cutoff number) requires
reasoning about that the restricted system can actually exhibit all valid behaviors of
the actual system with unbounded number of processes.
Systems with unbounded number of processes are known as parameterized sys-
tems. A parameterized system usually consists of finite number of process types,
each of which may contain unbounded number of instances. Verifying that a pa-
rameterized system satisfies certain specification entails proving that no matter how
many number of processes participating in the system, the specification is satisfied.
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In general, automated verification of parameterized system is undecidable [4]. Exist-
ing techniques for parameterized verification usually focus on developing their own
verification procedure, which is not only hard for third-party evaluation, but also dif-
ficult to scale to an efficient and effective checker for real-life systems. The problems
need to be addressed are whether : (1) the verification method is supported by a
powerful modeling language to describe non-trivial control systems and protocols; (2)
the checking is time/memory efficient; (3) it supports any spurious counter-example
detection techniques and its refinement; (4) the analysis of non-spurious traces leads
to any finite system that exhibits the same trace.
1.2 Objective and Scope
Our research aims to address the above mentioned problems by developing a usable
and efficient abstraction-refinement based automated verification framework for con-
current parameterized systems. Our abstraction deals with the number of processes
to keep track of, for process types in the system with unbounded number of pro-
cesses. Thus, for every process type with unbounded number of processes, a cutoff
number is assumed in the initial abstraction and then gradually refined by repeated
application of abstract - modelcheck - refine steps. Since our abstractions in general
lead to over- approximations of behavior, model checking of the abstracted system
may lead to spurious counter-examples. We develop automated methods to (i) check
whether a given counter-example trace is spurious, and (ii) refine our abstraction (by
increasing cutoff numbers) to eliminate a given spurious counter-example. Moreover,
for non-spurious counter-examples, we also developed heuristics to determine a small,
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finite system that exhibits the same trace.
In terms of implementation, we modify the internals of the well-known Spin model
checker [19] to integrate our proof method. Hence, any designer familiar with Spin
and its input modeling language Promela may easily adapt our method to verify
parameterized systems. Moreover, we take advantage of the powerful optimization
(such as partial order reduction, bitstate hashing, etc.) inside Spin to develop a time
and memory efficient model checker for parameterized systems.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as following: we survey related verification tech-
niques in Chapter 2, followed by an overview of our abstraction framework in Chap-
ter 3. We then proceed to discuss the concrete and abstract system modeling in
Chapter 4 and 5. The verification procedure, including our spuriousness detection
and abstraction refinement techniques, are presented in Chapter 6. The details of
how we modify the internals of Spin are presented in Chapter 7, while experiments
on several real-life software systems are discussed in Chapter 8. Finally, we conclude
this thesis in Chapter 9.
3
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND ON SYSTEM VERIFICATION
In this Chapter, we review related state-of-art research on parameterized system
verification, abstraction refinement and the Spin model-checker.
2.1 Parameterized System Verification
Verification of parameterized systems is undecidable [4]. There are two possible reme-
dies to this problem: either we look for restricted subsets of parameterized systems
for which the verification problem becomes decidable, or we look for sound but not
necessarily complete methods.
The first approach tries to identify a restricted subset of parameterized systems
and temporal properties, such that if a property holds for a system with up to a
certain number of processes, then it holds for every number of processes in the system.
Moreover, the verification for the reduced system can be accomplished by model
checking. Systems that are verified with this approach include systems with a single
controller and arbitrary number of user processes [17], rings with arbitrary number
of processes communicating by passing tokens [15, 14], systems formed by composing
an arbitrary number of identical processes in parallel [21], and systems formed by
unbounded processes of several process types where the communication mechanism
between the processes is restricted to conjunctive / disjunctive transition guards [13].
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The sound but incomplete approaches include methods based on synthesis of invis-
ible invariant (e.g., [16]) which can be viewed as a combination of assertion synthesis
techniques with abstraction for verification; methods based on network invariant (e.g.,
[25]) that relies on the effectiveness of a generated invariant and the invariant refine-
ment techniques; regular model checking [22, 23] that requires acceleration techniques.
Compositional proof methods have been studied in [6], while explicit induction based
proof methods for parameterized families have been discussed in [29].
Among the above mentioned works, we emphasize on the counter abstraction (e.g.,
[12, 28, 27]), which is closest to our current research work. These works also employ
process count abstraction. The verification of safety properties is discussed in [12],
the verification of liveness properties is addressed in [27].
Parameterized verification of extended system models having data variables with
unbounded domains have been studied in [24, 10, 7, 30]. These approaches combine
counter abstraction with data abstraction or linear-arithmetic constraints.
2.2 Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refine-
ment
Counter-example guided abstraction refinement has earlier been studied for verifica-
tion of large finite-state or infinite-state systems [11, 8, 9, 5]. The common approach
in these works is to abstract the variable domains based on the control flow predicates
in the program, so that the state space are partitioned into different abstract states.
When a counter-example is generated, it will be checked whether it corresponds to
a concrete counter-example in the original system. If so, a program error is found;
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otherwise, the predicates will be refined and the verification will start, either from
the very beginning or from point where the previous predicate becomes not-so-precise
(Lazy Abstraction [8]). This technique is mostly used in analysis of sequential pro-
grams, and systems with finite number of processes. Hence, if a system being verified
is infinite-state due to unbounded number of processes, it is not clear how to employ
the above mentioned abstraction refinement methods.
2.3 Spin: The Model Checker
Spin is a generic verification system that supports the design and verification of asyn-
chronous process systems. Spin verification models are focused on proving the cor-
rectness of process interactions, and they attempt to abstract as much as possible from
internal sequential computations. Process interactions can be specified in SPIN with
rendezvous primitives, with asynchronous message passing through buffered channels,
through access to shared variables, or with any combination of these. As a formal
methods tool, SPIN aims to provide [19]:
1. an intuitive, program-like notation for specifying design choices unambiguously,
without implementation detail;
2. a powerful, concise notation for expressing general correctness requirements;
3. a methodology for establishing the logical consistency of the design choices
from 1 and the matching correctness requirements from 2.
Spin accepts design specification written in the verification language Promela(a
Process Meta Language), and it accepts correctness claims specified in the syntax
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of standard Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Models specified in Promela are always
required to be bounded and have only countably many distinct behaviors. All verifica-
tion systems have physical limitations that are set by problem size, machine memory
size, and the maximum runtime that the user is willing, or able, to endure. These
constraints are an often neglected issue in formal verification. SPIN addresses this
issue by offering some complexity management techniques.
The basic structure of the Spin model checker is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The
typical mode of working is to start with the specification of a high level model of a con-
current system, or distributed algorithm, typically using SPIN’s graphical front-end
XSpin. After fixing syntax errors, one can choose to perform interactive simulation,
or generate an optimized on-the-fly verification program from the high-level specifica-
tion. This verification program is compiled, with various compile-time options for the
types of reduction algorithms to be used, and executed. If any counter examples to
the correctness claims are detected, the error trail can be fed back into the simulator
and inspected in detail to establish, and remove, its cause.
In Spin, the description of a concurrent system in Promela consists of one or
more user-defined process templates, or proctype definitions, and at least one process
instantiation. The templates define the behavior of different types of processes. Any
running process can instantiate further asynchronous processes, using the process
templates.
Spin translates each process template into a finite automata. The global behavior
of the concurrent system is obtained by computing an asynchronous interleaving prod-
uct of automata, one automaton per asynchronous process behavior. The resulting
7
global system behavior is itself again represented by an automaton. This interleaving
product is often referred to as the state space of the system, and, because it can easily
be represented as a graph, it is also commonly referred to as the global reachability
graph.
XSPIN
Promela parser LTL parser 
Syntax checker Interactive simulation
Verifier 
generator
Model checkerExecutable on-the-fly Verifier
Counter-example
Figure 2.1: The structure of SPIN simulation and verification [19]
In Spin, a correctness claim is to formalize erroneous system behaviors, i.e, be-
haviors that are undesirable. The verification process then either proves that such
behaviors are impossible or it provides detailed examples of behaviors that match.
To perform verification, SPIN takes a correctness claim that is specified as a tempo-
ral logic formula, converts that formula into a Bu¨chi automaton, and computes the
synchronous product of this claim and the automaton representing the global state
space. The result is again a Bu¨chi automaton. If the language accepted by this au-
tomation is empty, this means that the original claim is not satisfied for the given
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system. If the language is nonempty, it contains precisely those behaviors that satisfy
the original temporal logic formula.
Like other model checking techniques, Spin’s verification procedure is based on
some graph traversal methods. Two kinds of traversal methods available in Spin are
depth-first search and breadth-first search. In the worst case, the global reachability
graph has the size of the Cartesian product of all component systems. Although,
in practice, the size of the global reachability never approaches the worst case size,
the reachable portion of the Cartesian product can also easily become prohibitively
expensive to construct exhaustively. A number of complexity management techniques
have been developed to combat this problem. These techniques include partial order




We have developed an abstraction-refinement based automated proof method for pa-
rameterized systems. The systems of interest consist of finitely many process types,
each of which (may) have unbounded number of processes executing the same pro-
gram. Our abstraction and its refinement, which greatly assembles the abstract-verify-
refine loop, deal with the number of processes in the system.
An outline of our verification framework appears in Figure 3.1. The verification
procedure involves deriving an abstract verifier (based on model checker Spin) corre-
sponding to a given system model and property to be verified. Parameterized verifica-
tion of the system proceeds by executing the abstract verifier thus generated. At the
















Figure 3.1: Verification Framework
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violation in the system model, or a counter-example exhibiting the property violation.
Since, in general our abstraction is an over-approximation of concrete behaviors, a
counter-example obtained from the abstract verifier can be spurious. Thus, a spuri-
ousness check is performed on the counter-example obtained. If a counter-example
is not spurious, a system with finite number of processes exhibiting the same coun-
terexample is generated. Otherwise, we refine our abstraction to prevent the spurious
counter-example from occurring in the subsequent verification runs. Since parame-
terized system verification is undecidable [4], the abstraction-refinement loop shown
in Figure 3.1 is not guaranteed to terminate. Hence, user may specify a bound on
the number of refinement steps undertaken.
We now illustrate the various steps in our verification framework with the help
of a small example. Consider a system model consisting of a single process type p1
with no local variables. The transition system corresponding to process type p1 is
shown in Figure 3.2, where for i ∈ [0, 3], li represents a control location, and α0 – α2
represent the actions executed by a p1-process. Thus, for example, a process of type
p1 can move from location l0 to l1 by executing action α0. Assume now, that we want
to verify certain properties for this system model for any number of p1 processes. Let
us consider an unbounded number of p1 processes which are initially in the state l0.
In our abstract verification we only maintain the count of processes in various local
states, and not their individual states or identities. If the process count is unbounded
in some state, it is represented as ω during abstract verification. Further, a user-
provided p1 specific cutoff parameter (called cutp1) is used, such that ω represents
greater-than or equal-to cutp1 p1-processes. Then, (a) if a p1 process moves in to a
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state with cutp1 number of processes, the process count of that state becomes ω, and
(b) if a p1 process moves out of a state with currently ω number of processes, there
remains either ω or cutp1 number of processes in the source state.
We now consider verification of the given system against the following LTL prop-
erty: ¬(α0 ∧ Xα1 ∧ XXα2). It specifies that the action sequence σ = α0α1α2 can
never occur in a system execution. Initially, let cutp1 = 1. This means in the abstract
verification, the count of processes in any state li is either 0 (denoting no processes
in li) or ω (denoting one or more processes in li). Abstract verification returns a
counter-example trace, which is σ itself. The number of processes in different states
during abstract execution of σ are shown in the following.
Control Number of processes (cutp1 = 1)
state Initially After α0 After α1 After α2
l0 ω ω, 0 ω, 0 ω, 0
l1 0 ω ω, 0 ω, 0
l2 0 0 ω ω
l3 0 0 0 ω
However, it is easy to see that the counter-example trace σ cannot be exhibited
in any concrete system. At least two occurrences of α0 are required for α1 and α2
to be executed subsequently. Hence, σ is spurious. Trace σ can be exhibited in
the abstract system because after a single occurrence of α0, the process count in l1
becomes ω (since cutp1 = 1). Consequently, both α1 and α2 can be executed from
l1. In order to prevent this spurious counter-example, we refine our abstraction by











Figure 3.2: Example transition system for a process type p1.
count of processes in any state li is now either 0 (denoting no processes in li) or 1
(denoting exactly one process in li) or ω (denoting more than one process in li). Now,
after a single occurrence of α0 the process count at l1 will become 1 (and not ω),
which is not sufficient to execute both α1 and α2. As a result, σ can no longer occur
in abstract execution.
As another example, consider the LTL property ¬(α0∧Xα1), which specifies that
the action sequence σ′ = α0α1 can never occur. Similar to the previous example, here
also the abstract verification run returns a counter-example, which is σ′. However,
unlike above, σ′ is not spurious and can be exhibited in a concrete system. Further, we
can easily see that σ′ can be exhibited in a concrete system with only a single process
of type p1. Later, (in Section 6.2) we describe a heuristic procedure for deriving





We use (a fragment of) Promela, the input language of Spin, for modeling the
system to be verified. This enables a user already familiar with Spin, and hence
Promela, to readily use our parameterized verification framework.
We fix a finite set of process types P with p, q ranging over P . Each process
type in P corresponds to a process declaration via proctype in Promela. Various
processes, which are the instances of process types in P , are described by means of
finite-state labeled transition systems. We also fix a finite alphabet of actions Σ with
α, β ranging over Σ. Actions in Σ represent basic Promela statements, such that
an action in Σ may correspond to a send/receive event, an assignment, an assertion,
or creation of an instance of a process type. Various processes can communicate via
synchronous message exchange or through shared variables. With each action α ∈ Σ,
we associate– (a) a pre-condition Preα specifying a boolean condition to be satisfied
by a system state for executing α, and (b) a post-condition Postα capturing the
system state update upon execution of α.
We note here that Promela allows inter-process communication via shared vari-
ables, synchronous message passing as well as asynchronous message passing. In our
modeling, we restrict ourselves to systems which do not have asynchronous message
passing.
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In order to model the internal states and computations performed by processes,
we fix a set of local variables V arp for each process type p ∈ P , and a set of global
variables V arG. Assume that V arp ∩ V arq = ∅ whenever p, q ∈ P and p 6= q. Also,
let V arP =
⋃
p∈P V arp and V arP ∩ V arG = ∅. Each variable x ∈ V arP ∪ V arG takes
values from a finite domain Dx. Thus, a variable valuation refers to a mapping of
each variable to a value in its finite domain.
Definition 4.1 (System Model). A system model is a structure
S = (V arG, vgin, TSP)
consisting of (i) a set of global variables V arG, (ii) their initial valuation v
g
in and (iii)
a p-indexed family of transition systems
TSP = {TSp = (Lp,→p, lpin, V arp, vpin)}p∈P
such that for each p ∈ P,
• Lp is a finite set of p’s control states,
• →p⊆ Lp × Σ× Lp is a transition relation for p,
• lpin ∈ Lp is the initial control state of p, and
• V arp is the set of local variables in p, and vpin is their initial valuation.
Consider the example in Figure 3.2, which consists of a single process type p1 with
no local variables. The actions appearing in this specification are Σ = {α0, α1, α2},
and the transition system of p1 is represented as:
TSp1 = ({l0, l1, l2, l3},→p1 , l0, ∅)
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where →p1= {(l0, α0, l1), (l1, α1, l2), (l1, α2, l3)}.
Let OBJp denote a finite non-empty set of processes populating process type p.
We require that OBJp ∩ OBJq = ∅ whenever p 6= q. We set OBJ =
⋃
p∈P OBJp and
let o, o′ range over OBJ. Further, each variable x in the system has a finite domain
Dx. Hence, we let V alG be a mapping for each global variable to its finite domain,
and V alp be a mapping for each variable in process type p to its finite domain. We
denote V alP =
⋃
p∈P V alp. For each process type p, let Sp ⊆ Lp × V alp represent
the execution states of p, where Lp is the set of p’s control states describing TSp
and V alp is the set of valuations of variables in V arp. The initial p-state is given






in ∈ Lp is the initial p-control state and vpin is an initial
valuation of variables in p. We set SP =
⋃
p∈P Sp and let s, s
′ range over SP . Again,
consider the example shown in Figure 3.2. The initial state corresponding to process
type p1 is sp1in = (l0, ), where the variable valuation part is empty (represented as )
since p1 has no local variables.
In order to define the operational semantics of a system model, we define the
notion of a configuration capturing the global system state during execution. Since
we are defining a system configuration where the system consists of concrete processes,
we call it a “concrete configuration”. This is to distinguish this notion from the state
space abstraction and the abstract configurations we will introduce later.
Definition 4.2 (Concrete Configuration). Let S = (V arG, vgin, TSP) be a given sys-
tem model. A concrete configuration of S is a pair of mappings (vg,M), where vg
is a valuation of global variables V arG, and mapping M : SP → 2OBJ is defined such
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that:
• M(s) ⊆ OBJp for every p and every s in Sp,
• M(s) ∩M(s′) = ∅ whenever s 6= s′, and
• ⋃{M(s) | s ∈ Sp} = OBJp for every p.
Let CFG denote the set of all concrete configurations.
Given a system model S = (V arG, vgin, TSP) and an initial set of processes OBJinp
for each process type p, the initial configuration of S is defined as Cin = (vgin,M in),
where– (a) vgin is an initial valuation of global variables, and (b) for every p ∈ P
and every s ∈ Sp, M in(s) = OBJinp if s = spin, otherwise M in(s) = ∅. For the
example shown in Figure 3.2, suppose two instances (say, o1, o2) of process type p1
are created initially. Since, p1 has no local variables, all possible execution states of
p1 are determined by its local control states, i.e. Sp1 = {s0, s1, s2, s3} = SP , where
si = (li, ), with  representing an empty variable valuation. Also, since there are no
global variables in this example, the global variable valuations in this example will
also be empty (or, ). Then, the initial configuration in this case is given by: (,M in),
where M in(s0) = {o1, o2} and M in(s1) = M in(s2) = M in(s3) = ∅.
During execution, system moves from one concrete configuration to another by
participating in an action from Σ. If a process o of type p moves from state s1 ∈ Sp
at concrete configuration C = (v,M) to state s2 ∈ Sp by executing an action α ∈ Σ,
the processes at the resulting configuration C ′ = (v′,M ′) are determined as follows.
Let I : SP → 2OBJ be an intermediate mapping s.t.
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• If s1 6= s2, then
I(s1) = M(s1)− {o}.
I(s2) = M(s2) ∪ {o}.
I(s) = M(s) for s ∈ SP\{s1, s2}.
• Otherwise, ∀s ∈ SP , I(s) = M(s).
The relationship between the resulting mapping M ′ at configuration C ′ and the
intermediate mapping I is as follows – (i) If α does not create new process, then
M ′ = I, (ii) Otherwise, suppose by executing α, a new process oq of type q is created
and starts its execution from an execution state sq ∈ Sq. Then, we have
• M ′(sq) = I(sq) ∪ {oq};
• M ′(s) = I(s), for all s 6= sq.
We use relation updatec(s1,M, α, s2,M
′) to denote that the mapping M ′ can be
derived from M due to migration of a process from state s1 to s2 by executing α.
The transition relation for the concrete execution ↪→⊆ CFG×Σ×CFG is defined as
follows.
Definition 4.3 (Concrete Transition relation ↪→). Let C = (vg,M), C ′ = (v′g,M ′)
∈ CFG be concrete configurations of a system model S = (V arG, vgin, TSP), and α ∈ Σ
be an action. Then (C, α,C ′) ∈↪→ iff ∃p ∈ P , ∃s = (l, v), s′ = (l′, v′) ∈ Sp, s.t.
1. (l, α, l′) ∈→p is a transition in TSp.



















Figure 4.1: Sample Concrete Transition Relation
3. v and vg satisfy the pre-condition Preα.
4. v′(v′g) is the effect of post-condition Postα on v(vg). Here v
′
g represents an up-
date of global variables V arG, which can later be read/updated by other processes,
thus allowing for shared variable communication.
5. If last action executed was a send1 event, then α must be the corresponding
receive event. If the matching receive cannot be executed, then the last executed
send event is rolled back, and some other enabled action is executed in its place.
6. The relation updatec(s,M, α, s
′,M ′) holds as described above.
For the example shown earlier in Figure 3.2, we present its state exploration
graph depicting all reachable concrete configurations in Figure 4.1. Since, no global
variables are used in this example, we omit their valuation from a state representation.
In each global state, the processes presented in various execution states of process
type p1 are shown, which is the only process type appearing in this example. Also,
1Recall that, we only consider synchronous message communication.
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for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, si = (li, ), where li is the local control state of p1 and  represents an
empty local variable valuation. Initially, two processes of type p1 are created, which
are represented as o1 and o2 residing at state s0 = (l0, ). Then, either o1 or o2 can
be chosen to execute α0, following by the execution of α0 from the other process, or
the execution of either α1 or α2 from the same process, resulting in different paths in
the state exploration graph ending in two configurations with o1 residing at state s2





For efficient verification of parameterized systems, we employ an abstract state space
representation, where the core idea is to group together processes in a process type
which are in similar states. However, the grouping of processes is not fixed statically,
but changes dynamically with the state space construction. Two processes of type p
are similar if and only if they are in the same state s = (l, v) ∈ Sp, where l is the
control state in TSp (the transition system of p) and v is a valuation of p’s variables.
Based on this, the key idea in our abstraction is that, if two processes are in the same
execution state– there is no need to distinguish between them via their process ids.
Hence, our abstraction systematically exploits this observation by only maintaining
the count of processes in each execution state in
⋃
p∈P Sp.
Along with the state space abstraction as described above, we allow a process-type
to have an unbounded number of processes in our abstract execution semantics. If a
process type p initially has unbounded number of processes, or if p has unbounded
number of processes due to dynamic process creation during execution – the user
provides an input parameter cutp ∈ N. By default cutp is set to 1. Then, for any
number of processes equal to or greater than cutp, we represent it as ω.
For a process type p with initially fixed number of processes, and no dynamic
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process creation – the process counts never become ω and the number of processes
is fixed. Hence, the cutoff number is not an issue! We can simply assume the cutoff
number to be a number greater than the number of p-processes by default.
Based on our abstract state representation, we now define the notion of an abstract
configuration.
Definition 5.1 (Abstract Configuration). Let S = (V arG, vgin, TSP) be a given system
model and for each process type p ∈ P, Nap denote the number of p-processes during
execution. An abstract configuration is defined as a pair of mappings (vag ,Ma),
where vag ∈ V alG is a valuation of global variables and Ma : SP → N ∪ {ω} s.t.
∀p ∈ P ,∑s∈Sp Ma(s) = Nap .
Let CFGabs denote the set of all abstract configurations.
Let S = (V arG, vgin, TSP) be a given system model with Np number of processes
of type p ∈ P . Then, the initial abstract configuration of S is defined as Cina =
(ving ,M
in
a ), where– (a) v
in
g is the initial valuation of global variables, and (b) for every
p ∈ P and every s ∈ Sp, M ina (s) = Np if s = spin, otherwise M ina (s) = 0.
During execution, system moves from one abstract configuration to another by
executing an action from Σ. If a process of type p moves from state s1 ∈ Sp at
configuration Ca = (v,Ma) to state s2 ∈ Sp by executing an action α ∈ Σ, the
process counts at a resulting configuration C ′a = (v
′,M ′a) are determined as follows.
Let Ia : SP → N ∪ {ω} be an intermediate mapping, s.t. –
22
• If s1 6= s2, then
Ia(s1) =

Ma(s1)− 1, if Ma(s1) < cutp
cutp − 1 or ω, if otherwise.
Ia(s2) =

M(s2) + 1, if M(s2) < cutp − 1
ω, otherwise .
Ia(s) = M(s), for s ∈ SP\{s1, s2} (5.1)
• Otherwise, ∀s ∈ SP · Ia(s) = Ma(s).
If α does not create new process, then M ′a = Ia. Otherwise, suppose by executing
α, a process of type q is created and starts its execution from state sq ∈ Sq. Then we
set
• for state sq,
M ′a(sq) =

Ia(sq) + 1, if Ia(sq) < cutq − 1
ω, otherwise.
(5.2)
• for s ∈ SP\{sq}, M ′a(s) = Ia(s).
We use the relation updatea(s1,Ma, α, s2,M
′
a) to denote that mapping M
′
a can
be derived from Ma due to migration of a process from state s1 to s2 by executing
action α.
Note that, when there are ω processes in the source state s1 at configuration
Ca = (v,Ma, Da) (i.e. Ma(s1) = ω) and the destination state s2 is different from
s1, then two possible configurations may result from C
a as described above (see






) represents the resulting abstract configuration,
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then process count in state s1 at configuration C
a′ (i.e. Ma
′
(s1)) is either– (i) ω,
assuming there were greater than cutp processes in s1 at configuration C
a, or (ii)
cutp−1, assuming there were exactly cutp processes in s1 at configuration Ca. Similar
arguments apply to Da(m1) and D
a(m2) when there are ω number of channels with
contents m1. Given the above notion of abstract configurations CFGabs, we define an
abstract transition relation ↪→a⊆ CFGabs × Σ× CFGabs as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Abstract Transition Relation ↪→a). Let S = (V arG, vgin, TSP) be a






a) ∈ CFGabs be its abstract configurations,
and α ∈ Σ be an action. Then (Ca, α, C ′a) ∈↪→a if and only if ∃p ∈ P ,∃ s = (l, v), s′ =
(l′, v′) ∈ Sp, s.t.
1. (l, α, l′) ∈→p is a transition in TSp,
2. Ma(s) ≥ 1, i.e. there is at least one process in s,
3. v and vg satisfy the pre-condition Preα.
4. v′(v′g) is the effect of post-condition Postα on v(vg). Here v
′
g represents an up-
date of global variables V arG, which can later be read/updated by other processes,
thus allowing for shared variable communication.
5. If α
6. If last action executed was a send1 event, then α must be the corresponding
receive event. If the matching receive cannot be executed, then the last executed
send event is rolled back, and some other enabled action is executed in its place.
1Recall that, we only consider synchronous message communication.
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ω, 0, 0, 0
0, ω, 0, 0 ω, ω, 0, 0
α0
Each box is of the form:
0, 0, 0, ω
0, ω, ω, 0
0, 0, ω, 0 0, 0, ω, ω


















Figure 5.1: Partial (abstract) state exploration graph for p1 (Np1 = ω).
7. The relation updatea(s,Ma, α, s
′,M ′a) holds.
For illustration, we again consider the example in Figure 3.2. Assume that, an
unbounded number of processes (ω) of type p1 are created initially, and the default
cutoff number cutp1 = 1 is used. For i ∈ [0, 3], si = (li, ), where li is a control
location in TSp1, and since p1 has no local variables, their valuation is represented as .
Further, assuming that there are no global variables, we omit global variable valuation
from the abstract configurations. Hence, we represent the abstract configurations for
this system by a mapping Ma, such that Ma(si), i ∈ [0, 3] represents the number
of p1 processes in state si. Its partial abstract state exploration graph is shown
in Figure 5.1. Initially, action α0 is executed by a process in state s0 from the
initial configuration (Cina ), resulting in two different configurations C1 and C2. The
configuration C1a (towards left) corresponds to the case where ω represents exactly
one process in state s0 at C
in
a , while configuration C
2
a (towards right) corresponds
to the case where ω represents two or more processes in state s0 at C
in
a . Further,
all actions α0, α1 and α2 are enabled at configuration C
2
a , while only α1 and α2 are
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enabled at configuration C1a . The paths following these abstract configurations are
explored in a similar manner.
5.2 Soundness of Abstraction
We now show the soundness of proof search over the abstract state space. Before
proceeding to the proof, we first define a relation '⊆ CFG× CFGabs as follows.
Definition 5.3. For all Cc = (v
g
c ,Mc) ∈ CFG and Ca = (vga,Ma) ∈ CFGabs, Cc ' Ca
iff vgc = v
g
a, and ∀p ∈ P ,∀s ∈ Sp, Ma(s) ≥ |Mc(s)|.
We now prove that our abstract execution semantics is an over-approximation of
the concrete execution semantics.
Theorem 1. Let σ be a possibly infinite sequence of actions that can be exhibited in
the concrete execution of a system model S with initially N cp ∈ N processes of type p.
Then, σ can be exhibited in the abstract execution of S with initially Nap processes of
type p, where either Nap = ω or N
a
p ∈ N s.t. Nap ≥ N cp .
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we consider the following property. Recall that
↪→ and ↪→a denote the concrete and abstract transition relations respectively.
Property 1:
∀(Cc, α, C ′c) ∈↪→,∀Ca ∈ CFGabs, Cc ' Ca ⇒ ∃(Ca, α, C ′a) ∈↪→a, s.t. C ′c ' C ′a.









and Ca = (v
g
a,Ma) ∈ CFGabs, s.t. (Cc, α, C ′c) ∈↪→ and Cc ' Ca. Suppose by executing
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c) from Def. 4.3 holds.
Since Cc ' Ca, by Def. 5.3, vgc = vga; moreover, Ma(sα) ≥ |Mc(sα)| and Ma(s′α) ≥
|Mc(s′α)|. Thus, action α can be executed by choosing a process from state sα in




a) be the resulting abstract configuration.
Without loss of generality, we assume that sα 6= s′α.
If Ma(sα) ∈ N, by the definition of updatec and udpatea (ref. Sections 4 and 5),
we have intermediate mappings I ′c(sα) = Ic(sα)− {o} and I ′a(sα) = Ia(sα)− 1. Now,
we consider the following cases based on action α.
1. If α does not create new process and sα 6= s′α, then M ′a(sα) = I ′a(sα) and
M ′c(sα) = I
′
c(sα). Since Ma(sα) ≥ |Mc(sα)|, we have M ′a(sα) ≥ |M ′c(sα)|.
2. If, by executing α, a new process oq of type q is created and starts its execution
at state sq, then we have M
′
c(sq) = Mc(sq) ∪ {oq} and M ′a(sq) = Ma(sq) + 1.
Since Ma(sα) ≥ |Mc(sα)|, we have M ′a(sα) ≥ |M ′c(sα)|.
If Ma(sα) = ω, then by the definition of updatea, we always allow the possibility
that M ′a(sα) = ω. By the similar argument as in the case of Ma(sα) ∈ N, we have
M ′a(sα) ≥ |M ′c(sα)|. Similar argument applies to M ′a(s′α). Finally since the effect of
action α is the same on vgc and v
g




a . Therefore, C
′
c ' C ′a.
Property 1 establishes that ' is a simulation relation. To complete the proof of
the main theorem, we only need to show that the initial configurations in the concrete
and abstract execution semantics are related by '. This is indeed the case, and this
concludes the proof.
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5.3 When is the abstraction exact?
We have now established that our abstract execution semantics is an over approxi-
mation — any execution trace exhibited in the concrete execution semantics is also
exhibited in the abstract execution semantics. Further, our abstract execution seman-
tics is exact (i.e., any sequence of actions allowed by the abstract execution semantics
is also allowed by the concrete execution semantics) iff the following conditions hold–
C1. In abstract execution, the process counts in a process type p are always rep-
resented using a natural number (i.e. they never become ω) and are updated
following the usual arithmetic rules. Note that cutp does not play any role in
this case.
C2. For each process type p, the initial number of processes in abstract execution
(Nap ) is equal to the initial number of processes in the concrete execution (N
c
p),
i.e. Nap = N
c
p .
Definition 5.4. Let CFGabs (CFG) be the set of abstract (concrete) configurations
of system model S. Then for all Ca = (vga,Ma) ∈ CFGabs and Cc = (vgc ,Mc) ∈ CFG,
Ca 'a Cc iff vga = vgc and ∀s ∈ SP , (Ma(s) = |Mc(s)|).
Theorem 2. Let σ = α0α1 . . . be a possibly infinite action sequence exhibited in the
abstract execution of S satisfying C1, then σ can be exhibited in the concrete execution
of S satisfying C2, and for i ≥ 0, Cia 'a Cic, where Cia (Cic) is the abstract (concrete)
configuration before the abstract (concrete) execution of αi.
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we consider the following property. The ↪→
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and ↪→a denote the concrete and abstract transition relations respectively.
Property 2:
∀(Ca, α, C ′a) ∈↪→a,∀Cc ∈ CFG, Ca 'a Cc ⇒ ∃(Cc, α, C ′c) ∈↪→, s.t. C ′a 'a C ′c.









CFGabs, and Cc = (v
g
c ,Mc) ∈ CFG, s.t.(Ca, α, C ′a) ∈↪→a and Ca 'a Cc. Suppose by
executing action α in the abstract execution, a process of type p moves from state sα
to s′α, where sα, s
′
α ∈ Sp.
Since Ca 'a Cc, we have vga = vgc and ∀s ∈ SP , (Ma(s) = |Mc(s)|), which implies
that ∀s ∈ SP ,Ma(s) ∈ N. Hence, by the definition of updatea, we have intermediate
mappings I ′a(sα) = Ma(sα)−1 and I ′a(s′α) = Ma(s′α)+1. Moreover α can be executed
by a process op of type p at state sα in the concrete execution, which results in
the intermediate mappings – Ic(sα) = Mc(sα) − {op} and Ic(s′α) = Mc(s′α) + {op}.
Therefore, we have Ia(sα) = |I ′c(sα)| and Ia(s′α) = |I ′c(s′α)|. Now, based on the
characteristic of action α, we consider the following cases:
















a(sα) = |M ′c(sα)|, M ′a(s′α) = |M ′c(s′α)|.
2. If, by executing α, a new process of type q is created and starts its execution at
local state sq. Moreover, in concrete execution, this new process is identified as
oq. Then, in abstract execution, we have M
′
a(sq) = Ia(sq) + 1, and for all other
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s ∈ ScP , M ′a(s) = Ia(s). In concrete execution, we have M ′c(sq) = Ic(sq) ∪ {oq},
and for all other s ∈ SP , M ′c(s) = Ic(s). Therefore, we have M ′a(sα) = |M ′c(sα)|,
M ′a(s
′
α) = |M ′c(s′α)|.
Finally, the effect of α is the same on vgc and v
g
a. Therefore, we have C
′
a 'a C ′c.
Property 2 establishes that 'a is a simulation relation. It is easy to see that
C0a 'a C0c , i.e. the initial configurations in the abstract and concrete execution
semantics are related by 'a. This concludes the proof.
5.4 Extending Abstraction with Count Variables
In the previous section we discussed our state space abstraction which involved ab-
stracting away process ids. From the real life case studies that we have modeled for
our experiments, we observe that this counter abstraction alone is not sufficient for
modeling most of these examples. These examples generally involve a process (e.g.
a controller) that needs to communicate with, and maintain a count of processes of
another type (e.g. several clients). Then, if we intend to verify a system which has
an unbounded number of processes, say of type p, we cannot use a variable with a
finite domain to keep a count of p-processes.
5.4.1 Extended Abstraction Scheme
In order to keep track of the number of processes of type p with an unbounded
number of processes, we introduce process-count variables having the domain N ∪
{ω}. We denote the set of all process-count variables as V arω. For a process-count
variable, we only allow assignment operation that initializes it with a constant value
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or ω, as well as operations that increment or decrement its value by 1, and obey
the following execution semantics2. For a process-count variable v ∈ V arω used for
counting processes of type p:
v++ =





v − 1, v < cutp
cutp − 1 or ω, otherwise.
Moreover, v can be involved in a boolean expression: B ≡ v Relop c, where
Relop is a relational operator and c ∈ N. Here, we only consider the case where
Relop is ≤. If v ∈ [0, cutp), B evaluates to true if v ≤ c, and false otherwise. If
v = ω and c < cutp, then B is false. Otherwise, if v = ω and c ≥ cutp, then we non-
deterministically allow B to be either true or false. Various other relational operators
are considered in a similar manner.
Thus, if process type p has ω processes in abstract execution, the value of v lies
in the domain [0, cutp) ∪ {ω}, where ω indicates the value of v to be cutp or greater.
Further, when v is decremented by one (i.e. v−−), if the original value of v is ω,
then the resulting value of v is non-deterministically chosen to be either cutp−1 or ω.
The former (latter) choice corresponds to the possibility that value of v was equal-to
(greater-than) cutp.
In Promela, a process-count variable used for counting processes of type p, is
2The abstract semantics can be similarly extended to support increment/decrement of a process
count variable by any constant number c. The case c = 1, worked out here, is most common.
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declared using the following syntax– ‘abs p X’, where p is the process-type and X is
any valid string allowed in a variable name in Promela. This specific format allows
the verifier to identify and update these variables as per the rules described above.
Since the domain of variable x ∈ V arω includes the unbounded value represented
as ω, to distinguish it from the concrete domain of x, i.e. Dx (= N), we represent the
abstract domain as Dax (i.e. N∪ {ω}). Note that, for all other variables y ∈ (V arP ∪
V arG)\V arω, Day = Dy. Then, we use V alap to represent the abstract valuations
of variables in V arp, which is a mapping for each variable to its abstract domain.




p . The abstract valuations of global variables is represented
similarly as V alaG. Accordingly, the abstract states of a process type p are represented
as Sap ⊆ Lp × V alap , where Lp if the set of local states in the transition system TSp













Since the domain of variables in V arω differs in the abstract execution as compared
to the concrete execution, we are to establish a relation between valuation of variables
in the concrete and abstract execution as following. Let R be a relation between
valuation of variables in concrete and abstract domain: R ⊆ (V alG×V alP)×(V alaG×
V alaP). For all g ∈ V alG, f ∈ V alP , ga ∈ V alaG, fa ∈ V alaP : (g, f)R(ga, fa) iff
1. ∀v ∈ V arG\V arω, ga(v) = g(v).
2. ∀v ∈ V arP\V arω, fa(v) = f(v).
3. ∀v ∈ V arG ∩ V arω, ga(v) = g(v), if g(v) ∈ [0, cutp);
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and ga(v) = ω, otherwise.
4. ∀v ∈ V arP ∩ V arω, fa(v) = f(v), if f(v) ∈ [0, cutp);
and fa(v) = ω, otherwise.
5.4.2 Soundness with Process-count Variables
We now refine the relation '⊂ CFG × CFGabs with respect to R between concrete
and abstract configurations as follows.
Definition 5.5. For all Cc = (v
g
c ,Mc) ∈ CFG and Ca = (vga,Ma) ∈ CFGabs, Cc ' Ca
iff ∀p ∈ P, ∀sc = (l, vc) ∈ Sp,∃sa = (l, va) ∈ Sap , s.t.(vgc , vc)R(vga, va) ∧ Ma(sa) ≥
|Mc(sc)|.
We now prove that our abstract execution semantics is an over-approximation of
the concrete execution semantics.
Theorem 3. Let σ be a possibly infinite sequence of actions that can be exhibited in
the concrete execution of a system model S with initially N cp ∈ N processes of type p.
Then, σ can be exhibited in the abstract execution of S with initially Nap processes of
type p, where either Nap = ω or N
a
p ∈ N s.t. Nap ≥ N cp .
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we consider the following property. Recall that
↪→ and ↪→a denote the concrete and abstract transition relations respectively.
Property 1:
∀(Cc, α, C ′c) ∈↪→,∀Ca ∈ CFGabs, Cc ' Ca ⇒ ∃(Ca, α, C ′a) ∈↪→a, s.t. C ′c ' C ′a.
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and Ca = (v
g
a,Ma) ∈ CFGabs, s.t. (Cc, α, C ′c) ∈↪→ and Cc ' Ca. Suppose by executing








c) in Def. 4.3 holds.
Since Cc ' Ca, by Def. 5.5, ∃sa = (l, va) ∈ SaP , s.t.(g, f)R(ga, fa) ∧ Ma(sa) ≥
|Mc(sc)|, where g ∈ V alG, f ∈ V alP , fa ∈ V alaG, fa ∈ V alaP . Since α is executable
from sc, to show that α is also executable from sa in the abstract execution, we first
need to show that vga and va satisfy Preα. Since (v
g
c , vc)R(vga, va), let x be a variable
in the system, we consider the following cases:
1. If x ∈ V arG\V arω, then ga(x) = g(x), and hence ga(x) satisfies Preα. Similar
argument applies to x ∈ V arP\V arω.
2. If x ∈ V arG ∩ V arω, then ga(x) ≥ g(x). Now, consider boolean expression
B ≡ xRelopc, where Relop is any relational operator and c is a constant.
Here, we take the case where Relop is ≤ as an example. Various other relational
operators can be considered in a similar fashion. Since g(x) ≤ c evaluates to
true, we consider the evaluation of ga(x) ≤ c as follows.
• If g(x) ∈ [0, cutp), then ga(x) = g(x). Hence, ga(x) ≤ c evaluates to true.
• If g(x) ≥ cutp, then ga(x) = ω. Let g(x) = n0 ∈ N. Since ω represents
a value greater than or equal to cutp, ga(x) is possible to evaluate to n0
(n0 ≥ cutp). Therefore, we always allow the possibility that ga(x) ≤ c
evaluates to true.
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Hence, whenever g(x) satisfies Preα, ga(x) satisfies Preα. Similar argument
applies to x ∈ V arP\V arω.




a) ∈ CFGabs be the resulting abstract configuration, such that
a process moves to state s′a = (l
′, v′a) ∈ Sap by executing α in abstract execution.
Consider the global and local variables. For a variable x, let vc and v
′
c be the valu-
ation of x before and after execution of α in concrete execution, respectively. Their
corresponding valuations in the abstract execution are va and v
′
a. If x ∈ V arG\V arω,
then since vc = va and the effect of α on x in concrete and abstract executions are
identical. Hence, we have v′c = v
′
a. Similar result is obtained for V arP\V arω. If
x ∈ V arω, since va ≥ vc, by the operational semantics for abstract-count variables,
we have v′a ≥ v′c. Hence, we can easily see that (vg′c , v′c)R(vg′a , v′a).
Further, similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5, by the semantics of updatec
and udpatea, we have M
′
a(sa) ≥ |M ′c(sc)| and M ′a(s′a) ≥ |M ′c(s′c)|. Therefore, C ′c ' C ′a.
Property 1 establishes that ' is a simulation relation. To complete the proof of
the main theorem, we only need to show that the initial configurations in the concrete
and abstract execution semantics are related by '. This is indeed the case, and this
concludes the proof.
Note that under condition C1 and C2 (refer Page 28), Sap = Sp for all process type
p and Dax = Dx for all variable x. Hence, our abstraction is again exact. Theorem 2















Figure 5.2: Example of using process-count variable
5.4.3 Elimination of Spuriousness Caused by Process-Count Variables
In our modeling, process-count variables can be used as a global shared-variable or
local variable that keeps track of the number of processes in a particular control state
of a process type. The use of data abstraction, in particular, process-count variables,
introduces extra spurious behaviors in the system. This is mainly due to the fact that
a process-count variable and the actual number of processes that it keeps track of are
both updated in a non-deterministic manner. A server-client example in Figure 5.2
demonstrates the issue. In this example, a Server informs all the connected Clients
of its status, and the number of connected clients is maintained via Server’s local
variable abs Client l2. After one execution of send and receive actions, four global
states can be generated (Figure 5.3). The global states in dotted box are spurious,
since in these states, the process-count variable (abs Client l2) is unbounded while
the actual number of processes in the corresponding state (l2) is a concrete number
less than cutClient, or vise-versa.
To eliminate the spuriousness caused by using process-count variables, we require
that a process-count variable to be associated with a control state whose number
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Server: [s = (loc, abs_Client_l2), Ma(s)], …
Client:  [s = (loc), Ma(s)], …
S: [(l0, ω), 1]
C: [(l2), ω]
S: [(l0, cutclient-1), 1]
C: [(l2), ω], [(l3), ω]
S: [(l0, cutclient-1), 1]
C: [(l2), cutclient-1], [(l3), ω]
S: [(l0, ω), 1]






Each box is of the form:
Figure 5.3: Partial state exploration in the presence of process-count variable
of processes it keeps track of. In Promela, to count the number of processes at
local state l of a process type p, we follow the naming convention abs p l for the
associated process-count variable. Moreover, an internal variable (name it as int p l)
is used to maintain the execution choice of abs p l (i.e., ω − 1 = ω or ω − 1 = cutp).
During state space exploration, when control reaches an execution state s = (l, vp)
of process type p and an action α ∈ Σ is enabled, a check is performed to make
sure that Ma(s) matches the value of abs p l (note that, the only possible reason for
the two not matching is because the initial assignment of abs p l does not equal to
Ma(s), and hence should be reported as an error); moreover, after the execution of
α, Ma(s) is updated following our abstract semantics but with the same execution
choice as the update of abs p l. Consider the Server-Client example in Figure 5.2.
The control state associated with process-count variable abs Client l2 is l2 of process
type Client. When abs Client l2 is updated as a post-condition of action α0, internal
variable int Client l2 is updated; and when α2 is enabled from an execution state
s = (l2, vClient), Ma(s) is updated based on the value of int Client l2, which ensures
that the spurious global states (the dotted boxes in Figure 5.3) are never reached.
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To summarize, the use of process-count variables in a Promela model requires
the following steps:
1. Identify and label the control states that associate with any process-count vari-
ables.
2. Declare process-count variable (either local or global) using naming convention
abs p l, such that it counts the number of processes at control state (with label)




We now elaborate our verification procedure outlined earlier in Figure 3.1. It proceeds
on the abstract state representation discussed in the preceding.
6.1 Model Checking
We use linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [26] for specifying the properties to be veri-
fied. This decision is influenced by our use of model checker Spin [19] for implement-
ing our verification framework. Spin uses LTL as a property specification language.
Properties in LTL are specified using atomic-propositions, boolean-operators (¬, ∨,
∧), and temporal-operators (G, F , X, U , R).
As described earlier in Section 5.4, our system model may also contain process-
count variables (denoted as V arω), such that a variable v ∈ V arω is used for counting
processes of a given type, say p, with its domain ranging over [0, cutp) ∪ {ω}. Then,
for LTL property specification, we restrict the boolean expressions involving a global
process-count variable v to be of the form v Relop c, such that c ∈ [0, cutp) and
Relop is any relational operator. This restriction ensures deterministic evaluation of
boolean expressions involving the process-count variables.
Since we use Spin as our underlying implementation framework, we are able to
take advantage of its model checking capabilities. Spin performs on-the-fly (explicit)
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state-space construction, while trying to find a counterexample trace violating the
property being verified. If such a trace cannot be found, it means that the property
holds true in the given system model. Otherwise, a counterexample trace indicating
property violation is reported by Spin. Our abstract execution semantics allow us to
verify a family of concrete systems as follows.
Suppose a LTL property ϕ is satisfied in our abstract verification with Nap processes
of type p, where Nap ∈ N ∪ {ω}. Then, from Theorem 1, ϕ is also satisfied by all
concrete systems having N cp ≤ Nap processes of type p, where N cp ∈ N.
6.2 Spurious counter-example detection
Our abstract execution semantics is an over-approximation in terms of allowed ex-
ecution traces. Thus, a counter-example trace obtained from model checking over
the abstract state space may be spurious, i.e. it cannot be exhibited in any concrete
system with a finite number of processes (less-than or equal-to the number of pro-
cesses in the abstract execution for each process type). In the following, we present
an approach for detecting spurious counter-examples in the absence of process-count
variable, and discuss abstraction-refinement for eliminating them in the next section.
The result also holds in the presence of process-count variable with spuriousness elim-
ination introduced in section 5.4.3.
We now introduce some definitions on finite traces. Note that our spurious
counter-example detection and abstraction-refinement work for finite as well as in-
finite counter-example traces. The notions we introduce now, will work on finite
prefixes of counter-example traces obtained from model checking.
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Let σ = α1 . . . αn ∈ Σ∗ be a finite execution trace s.t., action αi is executed by a
process moving from execution state si ∈ SP to state s′i ∈ SP . We set src(αi) = si
and dst(αi) = s
′
i. For a state s ∈ SP , we define:
in(s, σ) = |{i | dst(αi) = s, i ∈ [1, n]}|
out(s, σ) = |{i | src(αi) = s, i ∈ [1, n]}|
Here, in(s, σ) (out(s, σ)) gives the number of processes moving in to (out of) state
s during the execution of σ. We use new(s, σ) (del(s, σ)) to represent the number
of processes that are created (deleted) during execution of σ such that, they start
(terminate) their execution in state s. For convenience, we also define the following
terms: enter(s, σ) = in(s, σ) + new(s, σ), and leave(s, σ) = out(s, σ) + del(s, σ).
Finally, we define predicate valid(s, σ) as:
init(s) + enter(s, σ)− leave(s, σ) > 0 (6.1)
Further, for a given finite trace σ and a process type p we define the quantity np,σ
as follows. We first determine leave(spin, σ), the number of p processes that move out
from the initial p-state spin ∈ Sp during the execution of σ. Then, we define
np,σ = min(Np, leave(s
p
in, σ)) (6.2)
where Np ∈ N ∪ {ω} is the initial number of processes of type p in the abstract ver-
ification run, i.e. Np = init(s
p
in). Note that np,σ ∈ N. Let Pre(σ) denote the set
of all prefixes of σ (excluding σ). We now consider two cases, based on whether a
counter-example is finite or infinite.
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Case-A: σ is finite. Let σ = α0 . . . αn be a finite counter-example trace obtained
from an abstract verification run s.t., action αi is executed by a process moving from
state si ∈ SP to state s′i ∈ SP , i.e. src(αi) = si and dst(αi) = s′i. We show that σ is
non-spurious ⇔ ∀γ ∈ Pre(σ), valid(s|γ|, γ) is true in abstract execution.
Proof. A.1 ⇐: Assume that ∀γ ∈ Pre(σ), valid(s|γ|, γ) is true in the abstract execu-
tion. We now show σ to be non-spurious, by showing that σ can be exhibited in the
concrete execution of a system where each process type p initially has np,σ processes.
The proof proceeds by induction on the length of σ.
Base case: It holds trivially for |σ| = 0.
Induction hypothesis: Trace σ1 = α0 . . . αk−1 can be exhibited in a concrete execution
with initially np,σ number of p-processes. Further, for all 0 ≤ i < k, action αi has the
same source state src(αi) and destination state dst(αi) in both concrete and abstract
execution.
Inductive step: We now consider execution of σ1 · αk. Since, σ1 is a prefix of σ and
∀γ ∈ Pre(σ), valid(s|γ|, γ) is true in the abstract execution, valid(sk, σ1) also holds
in the abstract execution. Here, k = |σ1| and sk is the state from which a process exe-
cutes αk in the abstract execution. Thus, init(sk)+enter(sk, σ1)−leave(sk, σ1) > 0 in
the abstract execution (see Eq. (6.1)). Note that, both leave(sk, σ1) and enter(sk, σ1)
depend on the source and destination states of processes executing various actions
in σ1. Since σ1 is also exhibited in concrete execution (from induction hypothesis),
the value of these quantities in concrete execution will be the same as in the abstract
execution. We now consider following two cases for execution of αk in the concrete
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execution.
1. If sk ∈ Sp is not the initial p-state (sk 6= spin), then init(sk) = 0 in both abstract
and concrete executions. Since, valid(sk, σ1) is true in the abstract execution, we get
enter(sk, σ1) > leave(sk, σ1), which will also hold in the concrete execution. Hence,
there is at least one process in state sk in concrete execution (after σ1) which can be
chosen to execute αk.
2. If sk = s
p
in is the initial p-state, then in the concrete execution there will be
initially np,σ = min(Np, leave(sk, σ)) processes in state sk. Since valid(sk, σ1) holds
true in the abstract execution, we get init(sk)(= Np) + enter(sk, σ1) > leave(sk, σ1).
Recall that np,σ = min(Np, leave(sk, σ)), as we are considering the case sk = s
p
in.
If np,σ = Np in concrete execution, since values of enter(sk, σ1) and leave(sk, σ1)
in concrete execution are same as in the abstract execution, valid(sk, σ1) is also
true in the concrete execution – a process can then be chosen from sk to execute
αk in concrete execution. Otherwise, np,σ = leave(sk, σ). Since in abstract exe-
cution αk is executed by a process in state sk (after occurrence of σ1), we have
leave(sk, σ) ≥ leave(sk, σ1) + 1. Thus, in the concrete execution valid(sk, σ1) also
holds since, init(sk)(= leave(sk, σ)) + enter(sk, σ1) > leave(sk, σ1), and a process
from state sk can be chosen to execute αk.
A.2 ⇒: We show this by contradiction. Assume that σ = α0 . . . αn is non-spurious.
Then σ can be exhibited in a concrete execution with N cp ≤ Np (N cp ∈ N) number of
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processes of type p, s.t. src(αi) = si and dst(αi) = s
′
i. Now assume that there exists
a γ = α0 . . . αk−1 ∈ Pre(σ) such that for j ∈ [0, k− 1] src(αj) = sj, dst(αj) = s′j, and
valid(sk, γ) (k = |γ|) is false. This implies init(sk)+enter(sk, γ)− leave(sk, γ) ≤ 0 in
the abstract execution. If sk = s
p
in is the initial state of a type p, then initially there
are Np processes in state sk in the abstract execution (i.e. init(sk) = Np in abstract
execution). In concrete execution init(sk) will be equal to N
c
p ≤ Np. Otherwise, if sk
is not an initial state of any process type, then initially there are zero processes in sk
in both abstract and concrete executions (i.e. init(sk) = 0).
Therefore, in either case, the value of init(sk) in concrete execution is less than or
equal to that in abstract execution. Further, since both leave(sk, γ) and enter(sk, γ)
depend on the source and destination states of processes executing various actions in
γ, their value in concrete execution will be same as in the abstract execution. Hence,
init(sk) + enter(sk, γ)− leave(sk, γ) ≤ 0 in the concrete execution, and there can be
no process in state sk after the occurrence of γ that can be chosen to execute αk,
which is a contradiction.
Case-B: σ is infinite. In this case, σ is of the form σpr(σsx)
ω. Here σpr and σsx
are finite action sequences s.t., (σsx)
ω represents an unbounded repetition of σsx, and
the abstract configurations before and after each iteration of σsx are same in abstract
execution. Let Sσsx ⊆ SP denote the execution states from/to which processes move
during an iteration of σsx. Then, we show that: σ is non-spurious ⇔ (i) σprσsx is
non-spurious, and (ii) ∀s ∈ Sσsx · enter(s, σsx) = leave(s, σsx).
Proof. B.1 ⇐: Suppose conditions (i) and (ii) hold above. Let σ′ = σprσsx. From
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condition-(i) we get that σ′ can be exhibited in a concrete system. In fact, by reusing
the arguments from Case-A.1 described earlier, we get that σ′ can be exhibited in a
concrete system with initially np,σ′ ∈ N processes for each process type p.
Further, condition-(ii) ensures that the number of processes residing in state
s ∈ Sσsx before and after each iteration of σsx are same. Hence, σsx can be re-
peated infinitely often in the concrete execution. This means σ = σpr(σsx)
ω is also
exhibited in a concrete execution with np,σ′ processes for each process type p
B.2 ⇒: Assume that σ is non-spurious. Then σprσsx is also non-spurious (i.e. con-
dition (i) holds), and it can be exhibited in a concrete execution. We use contra-
diction to show that condition (ii) also holds. Assume that there exists a state
s′ ∈ Sσsx such that enter(s′, σsx) 6= leave(s′, σsx). Consider the following two cases:
(a) enter(s′, σsx) < leave(s′, σsx), and (b) enter(s′, σsx) > leave(s′, σsx).
Case (a) above implies that after each iteration of suffix σsx, the number of pro-
cesses in state s′ will be strictly less than what it was before the occurrence of σsx.
Hence, after a finite number of iterations of σsx in concrete execution, the number of
processes in s′ will become 0. Therefore, σsx cannot iterate infinitely often.
Case (b) above implies that after each iteration of suffix σsx, the number of pro-
cesses in state s′ will be strictly greater than what it was before the occurrence of
σsx. Hence, the number of processes in s
′ will grow unboundedly as σsx is repeated
infinitely often. If s′ is a state of process type p, the number of processes in s′ is no
greater than the total number of processes of type p. However, in a concrete execution,
the total number of processes of each process type is bounded. Thus, σ cannot occur
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in a concrete execution (i.e. it is spurious), which contradicts our assumption.
6.3 Abstraction Refinement
We now discuss an abstraction-refinement approach for eliminating spurious counter-
examples.
Finite counter-example. Let σ = α0 . . . αn be a finite spurious counter-example
such that, action αi is executed by a process moving from state si ∈ SP to state s′i ∈
SP in the abstract verification, i.e. src(αi) = si and dst(αi) = s′i. Recall that, Pre(σ)
is the set of all execution prefixes of σ, excluding σ itself. Since, σ is spurious, there
exists a prefix γ ∈ Pre(σ) such that valid(s|γ|, γ) is false (see Section 6.2, Case-A).
We determine the smallest prefix σm = α0 . . . αk−1 such that, in abstract execution:
(i) ¬valid(sk, σm), where k = |σm|, and (ii) ∀γ ∈ Pre(σm) · valid(s|γ|, γ). Since,
valid(sk, σm) (k = |σm|) is false, this implies init(sk)+enter(sk, σm)−leave(sk, σm) ≤
0. Hence, after the occurrence of σm in abstract execution there can be no processes
in state sk. However, αk is executed by a process from sk after the occurrence of σm in
abstract execution – this is only possible, if process count in sk becomes unbounded
(i.e. ω) during execution of σm. Assuming sk is a state of process type p, its process
count can become ω only if number of processes in sk becomes cutp (the cutoff number
of p) during execution of σm. In order to prevent the process count in sk from
becoming ω in abstract execution, we determine the maximum number of processes
that can reside in sk during execution of σm, i.e. max(sk, σm) = max{init(sk) +
enter(sk, γ)−leave(sk, γ)|γ ∈ Pre(σm)}. Consequently, we set cutp = max(sk, σm)+1
46
to prevent the occurrence of spurious trace σ in subsequent abstract verification runs.
For illustration, consider the system model with a single process type p1 as
shown in Figure 3.2 and the LTL property ¬(α0 ∧ Xα1 ∧ XXα2), specifying that
the trace α0α1α2 never occurs. As shown earlier in Section 3, with cutp1 = 1, σ
can be exhibited in the abstract execution s.t., src(α0) = (l0, ), dst(α0) = (l1, ),
src(α1) = src(α2) = (l1, ), dst(α1) = (l2, ) and dst(α2) = (l3, ). Our check finds
σ to be spurious, as there exists σm = α0.α1 s.t. valid(s|σm|, σm) is false, where
s|σm| = s2 = src(α2) = (l1, ). This is because, during execution of σm, we have
init(s2) = 0 and enter(s2, σm) = leave(s2, σm) = 1. Considering all prefixes of σm,
we can easily find that max(s2, σm) = 1. Then, if cutp1 is set to 2, the execution
sequence σ can no longer be exhibited in the abstract execution.
Infinite counter-example. Here σ = σpr(σsx)
ω. From Case-B in Section 6.2, σ is
spurious if either–
(i) σprσsx is spurious. This case is similar to that of the finite spurious counter-
example discussed in the preceding.
(ii) σprσsx is not spurious, but there exists a state s belonging to some process
type p, from which a p-process executes one of the actions appearing in σsx s.t.
enter(s, σsx) 6= leave(s, σsx) in abstract execution.
For case (ii), since suffix σsx is repeated infinitely often in the abstract execution
of σ, the abstract configuration, and hence, the process counts in state s are the
same during repeated execution of σsx in σ. As enter(s, σsx) 6= leave(s, σsx), this is
only possible if the count of processes in s is approximated to ω sometime during the
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repeated execution of σsx. We consider two sub-cases.
(ii-a) The process count in s is ω at the beginning/end of every execution of σsx
(in the abstract execution of σ).
(ii-b) The process count in s is a natural number n0 at the beginning/end of
every execution of σsx (in the abstract execution of σ). However, it grows to ω during
execution of σsx (and shrinks back to n0 before next execution of σsx).
For case (ii-a), the process count in s is ω at the beginning of the first execution
of σsx while executing σ = σpr(σsx)
ω, that is, at the end of σpr itself. Our abstraction
refinement sets the cutoff number of process type p to the maximum value of 1 +
init(s) + enter(s, γ) − leave(s, γ), where γ ∈ {σpr} ∪ Pre(σpr). This bounds the
maximum number of processes in state s after execution of σpr.
For case (ii-b), our abstraction refinement similarly prevents the process count
from becoming ω in s during the execution of σsx in σ. Here we set the cutoff number
of process type p to 1 +max{n0 + enter(s, γ)− leave(s, γ)|γ ∈ Pre(σsx)}.
6.4 Deriving a finite-state system for a non-spurious
counter-example
Finally we discuss the derivation of a system with finite number of processes that can
exhibit a given non-spurious counter-example trace σ. Thus, trace σ is obtained from
our abstract verification with unbounded number of processes, and then shown to be
non-spurious (as per our spuriousness check). We consider two cases.
(i) σ is finite. Then from Section 6.2, Case-A.1, we know that σ can be exhibited
in a finite state system with initially np,σ ∈ N number of processes of type p. From
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Eqn. (6.2) page 41, when the number of processes of type p is unbounded, np,σ is
equal to leave(sinp , σ) — the number of processes exiting the initial state of p while
executing σ.
(ii) σ is infinite and hence is of the form σpr · (σsx)ω. Let σ′ = σprσsx. Since σ is
non-spurious, from Section 6.2, Case-B.1, σ can be exhibited in a finite state system




Spin [19, 18] is a popular open-source linear-time temporal logic (LTL) model checker
for software verification. In this section, we describe our modifications involving
process abstractions to Spin, and for convenience call the modified version as Spin++.
7.1 Abstract State Representation
In Spin, the state of each active process in the system is maintained separately during
verification. The information maintained corresponding to each process consists of
its current control state and a valuation of its local variables. In addition, a unique
process id is used to identify each process in the system.
We modify the default Spin state representation by introducing abstraction over
process identities in Spin++, such that process instantiations of the same process-
type (declared using keyword proctype in Spin) are no longer distinguished based on
their process ids. Moreover, we no longer maintain the state of each process separately.
Instead, processes corresponding to the same process-type, say p, are grouped into
partitions during execution. Each such partition is identified by a p-state in Sp,
consisting of a control state in TSp and a valuation of p’s local variables. Then, at
runtime, corresponding to each process type we maintain a set of its partitions, and
the number of processes currently residing in each partition. Note that, the partition
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Figure 7.1: State representation in Spin and Spin++
set of a process type only contains partitions with at least one process in them; if the
process count of a partition becomes zero after some action at run time, then this
partition is removed from the partition set.
State Storage and Matching In Spin, each system state in the current explo-
ration graph is stored for state matching during verification. In the Spin state rep-
resentation, the order of processes is fixed for all the states, and comparison of any
two states is done byte by byte, with time complexity linear in the size of a system
state. Consider the example shown in Figure 7.1(a), where type p has two actions
α1 and α2, and no local variables (hence, p’s execution state is characterized by its
local control state). Two processes o1 and o2 of type p are created, and a sequence
of actions σ = α1α1α2 occurs. This results in the generation of four global states
as shown in Figure 7.1(b), with V iG (i ∈ [0, 4]) representing the valuations of global
variables. We assume that α1, α2 do not modify global variables.
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However, with process abstraction in Spin++, although the order of active pro-
cess types in each system state is fixed, the order of partitions within a process type
p (representing p’s execution states, i.e. a subset of Sp with non-zero processes) may
vary. This occurs due to the addition or deletion of partitions, as processes move in
or out1 of partitions. Therefore, to be able to use the default Spin state matching al-
gorithm, we first sort the partitions corresponding to each process type before storing
them in the state vector. Consider the same example in Figure 7.1(a). The abstract
system states visited during the execution of σ are shown in Figure 7.1(c). Among the
four abstract global states generated, two of them (namely, AS1 and AS3) differ only
in the permutation of partitions of type p. This is due to the dynamic addition and
deletion of partitions as illustrated. As shown, sorting the partitions in AS3 results
in state AS1 and hence, AS3 is not stored as a new state in the state space.
7.2 Preservation of Spin Optimizations
Optimization techniques in Spin fall into two categories– (a) reducing the number of
reachable system states that must be searched to verify properties (e.g. partial order
reduction and statement merging), and (b) reducing the amount of memory needed
to store each state (eg. collapse compression and bitstate hashing).
Partial Order Reduction The partial order reduction and statement merging
techniques are based on the knowledge of dependency relations among different tran-
sitions in a system model. In Spin [19], to avoid any run-time overheads, these
1A partition is deleted when its process count becomes zero.
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Figure 7.2: Partial Order Reduction in Spin++
dependency relations are computed off-line, before a model checking run is initi-
ated. In our case, we only modify the state representation in Spin without affecting
the syntax or semantics of other operations. Hence, the dependency relations, and
consequently the partial order reduction and statement merging are preserved with
process abstractions in Spin++. For illustration, consider a system consisting of a
global variable g and a process type P with local variable x as shown in Figure 7.2(a).
The state exploration graph for this example in Spin++ with two instantiations of
process type P is shown in Figure 7.2(b). Note that, for any two instantiations of P ,
transitions labeled x = 1 and g = g+ 2 are mutually independent, and their different
inter-leavings would lead to the same system state. For example, in Figure 7.2(b) the
two paths –S1.S2.S4 and S1.S3.S4– between system states S1 and S4 are considered
equivalent. Hence, with partial order reduction enabled in Spin++, the dashed path
(S1.S2.S4) in Figure 7.2(b) is not explored.
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Collapse compression In addition, Spin++ can also take advantage of state com-
pression techniques such as collapse compression and bit-state hashing. Collapse com-
pression addresses the state space explosion problem by dividing a system state into
several “components”. These “components” are then assigned a unique index number
and stored separately. This technique tries to exploit the observation that most of the
components of two distinct system states may be the same. When collapse compres-
sion is enabled in Spin, the global data objects and each active process in a system
state are identified as system components. For example, in Figure 7.1(c), the global
state S1 of original Spin consists of three components: value of global variables, state
of o1 and state of o2. In Spin++, we consider the following as system “components”
in a global system state — value of global variables, and the count of processes in
each local state of each process type. For example, for the abstract global state AS1
in Spin++ as shown in Figure 7.1(c), the “components” would be – global informa-
tion, and partitions s0 = (l0, ), s1 = (l0, ) of type P ( denotes emptiness of local
variables). In other words, each local state (with process count greater than 0) of a
process type is considered as a system component in our state representation. This
enables the designer to use Spin’s collapse compression optimization on our abstract
state space.
Bitstate hashing In Spin, each system state is represented as a sequence of bits
(i.e, a bitvector). With bitstate hashing enabled, a hash table containing single bit
entries is used to store the visited states information. Further, a parameter k is
used such that, k independent hash functions are applied to a system state, with
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each function pointing to an entry in the hash table. Then, if all the k entries in
the hash table corresponding to some state are found to be 1, it indicates that the
state has already been visited. Otherwise, the state has not been visited and any
of the corresponding k bits that are 0 are set to 1. In Spin the default value of
k is 2 and can be set to other values using runtime options. Since several system
states can map to the same hashtable entry, state space search with bitstate hashing
may not be exhaustive. Of course, any counter-examples found can still be used for
debugging. In our tool Spin++, we also allow the designer the flexibility of using
bitstate hashing. The only change is in how the bitvector representation of a system
state is constructed. As mentioned earlier, a system state in the abstract state space
consists of (a) the state of global variables and (b) process counts for all local states
of all process types (for those local states where the process count is greater than 0).
This state representation gets converted into a bitvector. The rest of the state space
traversal — applying hash function(s) to the bitvector, looking up the hashtable, and
storing 0/1 in a hash table entry depending on whether the state is visited – remains




In this section, we first describe our restrictions on Promela for system specification,
and on LTL properties for property specification. We then discuss various experimen-
tal results involving the use of Spin++ for verification. All our experiments were done
on a Pentium-IV 3 GHz machine with 2 GB of main memory.
8.1 Restrictions
Our proof method is applicable to verification of arbitrary LTL properties for any
Promela model, subject to the following restrictions. Recall that Promela is the
input language of the Spin model checker [19, 18] which allows system modeling via
concurrent processes communicating by shared variables and/or message passing.
Restrictions on Promela model Below, we summarize our restrictions on model
specifications described in Promela.
• Since we suppress the use of process ids in our abstraction, we disallow the use
of special Spin variables pid and last, which can refer to individual process
ids. For the same reason, we avoid accessing or checking the value returned by a
run statement (which creates a process and returns the process id in Promela).
• Only channels of size 0 can be declared, i.e. communication via message passing
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is synchronous. In addition, we allow inter-process communication via shared
variables.
Any Promela model satisfying these two restrictions can be verified in our pa-
rameterized verification framework. Thus, the user can now model parameterized
systems using a rich and popular modeling language like Promela, rather than hav-
ing to construct FSMs for each process type. Note that dynamic process creation and
annihilation is allowed in our system model.
Restrictions on LTL property Given a Promela model satisfying the above
restrictions, we verify any LTL property with the following restrictions.
• Atomic propositions in the LTL property do not refer to process identifiers. For
example we cannot have an atomic proposition of the form pid == 1 where pid
is a local variable capturing process identifiers. This restriction stems from our
count abstraction which does not keep track of process identifiers.
• Recall that our system model may also contain process-count variables (denoted
as V arω), such that a variable v ∈ V arω is used for counting processes of a
given type, say p, with its domain ranging over [0, cutp) ∪ {ω}. Then, for LTL
property specification, we restrict the boolean expressions involving a process-
count variable vp (which counts processes of type p) to be of the form vp Relop c,
such that c ∈ [0, cutp) and Relop is any relational operator. This restriction
ensures deterministic evaluation of boolean expressions involving the process-
count variables.
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Table 8.1: Promela modeling results
Example # Global Process # Local # Local
Vars type Vars Control Loc.
Client 0 26
CTAS 1 CM 2 77
WCP 0 8
Env 2 6
MOST 3 NS 0 5
NM 5 37
Handoff 0 4
Meta-lock 3 Shared Obj. 0 10
Thread 1 7
Futurebus+ 17 Cache 0 11
8.2 Examples Modeled
For experiments, we modeled the following four examples. In Table 8.1, we summarize
the key statistics of the Promela models for each of these examples.
The first example is a weather update controller, which is an important component
of the Center TRACON Automation System (CTAS) automation tools developed by
NASA for controlling air-traffic in large airports [1]. It consists of a central controller
(CM), a weather-control panel (WCP), and several Client processes. Clients first get
connected to the CM. Subsequently, all connected clients are updated with the latest
weather information from WCP via CM.
The second example models part of the Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST)
protocol [2], which is a networking standard designed for interconnecting various
multimedia components in automobiles. The main components consist of a network-
manager (NM) and several network-slaves (NS). We model the network management
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part of this protocol which ensures secure communication between various applica-
tions in the MOST network.
The third example is the Java-metalock [3] protocol, a distributed algorithm en-
suring mutually exclusive access to a shared object (S) among arbitrary number of
Java Threads. A hand-off process (H) handles the race between the releasing thread
and several threads waiting to acquire S. If the object S is not-busy (i.e, no thread
currently owns it), then a requesting thread is immediately granted access to it. Oth-
erwise, S is busy and the owner thread releases access of S to one of the requesting
threads via the hand-off process.
As the final example, we modeled the cache coherence part of the IEEE Future-
bus+ Protocol [20], where we restrict our model to contain only a single bus segment
with one shared-memory module and multiple caches.
8.3 Reachability Analysis
The initial set of experiments involved doing a reachability analysis for the examples
modeled using both Spin and Spin++. The main aim of these experiments was to–
(i) compare the run-time and memory usage between Spin and Spin++, and (ii) ex-
perimentally evaluate the benefits of partial order reduction and collapse-compression
optimizations in Spin++. For each example we created several versions differing in
the number of processes.
The experimental results for state space exploration are shown graphically in
Figure 8.1. As we can observe, Spin++ clearly outperforms Spin by a significant



































































































Figure 8.1: State space exploration results.
increasing number of processes, while almost linear growth is observed for both run-
time and memory usage for Spin++, the growths are exponential in case of Spin.
The results with ω number of processes using Spin++ are also shown (the last entry
in these graphs).
In Figure 8.2, we show the reduction in the number of states explored due to partial
order reduction (POR) for MOST and Java Meta-lock protocols in Spin++. We are
able to take significant advantage of POR using Spin++ on these two protocols. The
results for CTAS and Futurebus+ are omitted here, as they do not exhibit a significant
improvement with POR enabled. For CTAS, there is almost no concurrency among






































Figure 8.2: Partial order reduction in Spin++.
Table 8.2: Collapse compression in Spin++.
Example # of No Collapse Compr. Collapse Compr.
(Proc. Type) Proc. Mem(MB) Time(s) Mem(MB) Time(s)
CTAS 100 489.62 39.41 236.60 64.95
(Clients) 200 O.M. – 1512.67 1037.00
MOST 350 699.04 40.04 298.87 57.36
(Slaves) 700 O.M. – 1367.03 354.44
Metalock 1.5× 105 653.29 56.27 479.93 86.67
(Threads) 3× 105 1304.38 119.67 959.40 190.19
Futurebus+ 50 26.88 2.07 26.47 3.24
(Caches) 100 190.42 16.74 186.94 29.16
O.M. indicates Out of Memory.
one; for Futurebus+ protocol, most transitions involve modification of shared global
variables (used for communication) and hence, are not independent.
Finally, with collapse compression enabled in Spin++, we could verify larger
models which would otherwise run out of memory (see Table 8.2). For example,
CTAS with 200 Clients and MOST with 700 Slaves cannot be explored without using
collapse compression. Both these instances ran out of memory as indicated by O.M.
In case of Futurebus+ protocol, we observe less memory reduction as compared with
the other two protocols. This is because, its model contains no local variables and a
process state only consists of a control location. Hence, no significant reduction can
be obtained using collapse compression.
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Table 8.3: LTL property verification in Spin++.
Example # Proc. Mem (MB) Time Result Cutoff
P1: G(disabled ⇒ F(¬disabled))
10 Clients 4.97 0.23s
√
—
CTAS 20 Clients 14.09 1.23s
√
—
ω Clients 3.31 0.06s
√
1
P2: G(regValid ⇒ F(regUpdtd))
10 Slaves 4.27 0.08s
√
—
MOST 20 Slaves 7.96 0.28s
√
—
ω Slaves 3.31 0.02s
√
1
P3: G(abs Thread isOwner ≤ 1)
Java 50 Threads 3.28 0.03s
√
—
Metalock 100 Threads 3.41 0.05s
√
—
ω Threads 3.26 0.01s
√
2
P4: G(abs Cache em > 0⇒ abs Cache eu == 0)
10 Caches 3.36 0.03s
√
—
Futurebus+ 20 Caches 4.81 0.17s
√
—
ω Caches 3.62 0.09s
√
2
8.4 Verification of LTL properties
We verified our examples against some interesting LTL properties using Spin++.
Here, we consider one property for each example and present the verification results.
The verification results for our examples appear in Table 8.3.
For CTAS, the weather-panel (WCP) is disabled each time there is an interaction
initiated between Clients and the central-controller (CM), and is enabled once the
interaction is over. Hence, for CTAS we specify a liveness property: whenever WCP
is disabled, it will eventually be enabled (property P1, Tab. 8.3).
In case of MOST, we verify the property — whenever network-manager receives
a valid registration message from any slave, its registry gets updated (property P2,
Tab. 8.3).
For the Java meta-lock protocol, we verify the invariant property that at most
62
one thread can own a shared object at any point of time (property P3, Tab. 8.3).
For Futurebus+, we verify the property — if a cache holds an exclusively-modified
copy of data, then no other caches can hold an exclusively-unmodified copy of the
same data (property P4, Tab. 8.3).
As we can observe from Table 8.3, all examples satisfied the respective properties
with initially a concrete number of processes for various process types. For these ex-
periments, the choice of cutoff number is not an issue — since the number of processes
is fixed initially and there is no unbounded process creation in these examples. In
other words, the process counts never become ω, thus avoiding any spurious behaviors
during abstract verification.
For experiments with an unbounded (ω) number of processes for some process
type, spurious counter-examples may be reported by abstract verification. During
abstract verification, the CTAS and MOST protocols satisfied their respective prop-
erties, with a cutoff number 1. For Futurebus+ protocol, a finite counter-example of
length 34 was obtained, with cutoff number 1. However, our spuriousness check proce-
dure (see Sec. 6.2) found this counter-example to be spurious. Using our abstraction-
refinement approach (see Sec. 6.3), we obtained a new cutoff number of 2 for process-
type Cache. Subsequently, verification with an unbounded number of caches in Fu-
turebus+ protocol also succeeded. For the Java meta-lock protocol also, verification





In this thesis, we have presented our research on a usable and efficient verification
framework for concurrent parameterized systems. Our verification method is based
on the principle of abstraction refinement. Our abstraction only keeps the number of
processes for each process type, but abstracts away the individual process identities.
The abstraction was shown to be sound and exact. If a counter-example is found
in model checking and is shown to be spurious, then the abstraction is refined by
increasing the cutoff number for the process type consisting of unbounded number of
processes. Moreover, if a counter-example is non-spurious, then heuristics is used to
construct a small, finite system that is sufficient to exhibit the same counter-example
trace.
We modified Spin to integrate our verification techniques. The modified Spin
(called Spin++) has been successfully used to verify several real-life software systems.
In terms of future works, there are many directions that we can pursue. First of
all, our current verification framework can be extended to handle unbounded data
domain. Many parameterized verification techniques are suitable for analyzing proto-
cols consisting of large, finite-state systems. However, there are systems that cannot
be modeled as finite-state systems, mainly due to unbounded data domains. Our
use of process-count variables (in section 5.4) is a way of handling variables with
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unbounded data domain, provided that the variable refers to process counts of the
other process types. However, for protocols with global or local variables that grow
unbounded regardless of the number of processes in the system, we may consider
integrating predicate abstraction into our current verification framework. The idea
is that, instead of keeping track of the number of processes at each local state, we
keep track of the number of processes at each local state that satisfy or not-satisfy
the given predicates.
Secondly, many distributed protocols, as well as real-life software systems, con-
sist of processes that are not only distinguished by their identities, but also their
connections/communication with other processes within the system (eg. leader elec-
tion in a ring structure, where each process needs to have neighboring information).
Hence, we may consider applying our count abstraction to the number of communi-
cation/association between processes.
Additionally, automatic counter-example explanation techniques may be inte-
grated into our verification for easier debugging.
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